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While the latter part of the 20th Century was defined by the great revival in liberal 
fortunes as it defeated its main ideological adversaries, the liberal wars of the past 
decade or so have put the project into evident crises. With claims to planetary peace 
inaugurating what turned out to be an unwinnable war upon local forms of 
autonomy3, once held inhibitions to the liberal advance in the name of global security, 
peace and prosperity have been displaced by the veritable retreat from the zones of 
conflict and instability. Once held claims of universality as such now appears 
increasingly redundant. Indeed, not only does contemporary liberalism seem 
politically, ethically and economically bankrupt as a direct result of its attempts to 
forcefully impose upon unwitting populations a distinctly violent liberal way of 
establishing political rule4, so many of its fundamental tenants are seemingly 
undone5. It would be incorrect however to imply the end of the violence of the liberal 
encounter. On the contrary, as liberal ways of violence increasingly takes place at a 
distance, most notably evidenced in the shift to unmanned aerial technologies for 
targeted assassinations, new justifications are put forward regarding these new 
modalities of violence, along with its political and philosophical rationalisations. This 
raises a number of pressing questions. Not least, how might we deconstruct these new 
modalities to provide a meaningful diagnostic of the changing political fortunes of 
liberal rule?        
                                                                        
1 I’d like to thank James Martel, Julian Reid, Michael Shapiro and Gil Anidjar for their comments on earlier drafts of this 
paper. I would also like to thank the reviewer’s comments for helping me nuance my critique and sharpen the focus of the 
paper. 
2 Brad Evans is a senior lecturer in international relations at the School of Sociology, Politics & International Studies 
(SPAIS), University of Bristol, UK. He is the founder and director of the histories of violence project. In this capacity, he is 
currently leading a global research initiative on the theme of “Disposable Life” to interrogate the meaning of mass 
violence in the twenty- first century. Brad’s latest books include Disposable Futures: The Seduction of Violence in Age of 
Spectacle (with Henry A. Giroux, CityLights 2015), Resilient Life: The Art of Living Dangerously (with Julian Reid, Polity 
Press, 2014), Liberal Terror (Polity Press, 2013), and Deleuze & Fascism: Security, War, Aesthetics (with Julian Reid, 
Routledge, 2013). He is currently working on a number of book and film projects, including Histories of Violence: An 
Introduction to Post-War Critical Thought (with Terrell Carver, Zed Books, 2015). 
3 See in particular Michael Dillon & Julian Reid, The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life Live (London: Routledge, 
2009); Mark Duffield, Development, Security & Unedning War: Governing the World of Peoples (Cambridge, Polity 2007); 
and Brad Evans [ed.] “Against the Day: Liberal War” (The South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 110 (3) ISSN 0038-2876) 746-793 
4 Brad Evans, Liberal Terror (Cambridge, Polity press: 2013) 
5 Brad Evans & Julian Reid, Resilient Life: The Art of Living Dangerously (Cambridge, Polity Press: 2014) 
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To map out the changing contours of liberalism as diagnosed through the violence 
carried out in its name, this paper turns to the work of Walter Benjamin. His work on 
violence has captured the attention of many great scholars and subsequently 
influenced some of the most important reflections by the likes of Hannah Arendt, Carl 
Schmitt, Jacques Derrida, Jurgen Habermas, Giorgio Agamben, Slavoj Zizek, Judith 
Butler and Simon Critchley to name a few. Benjamin’s contributions are undoubtedly 
rich and complex in terms of its philosophical layering. This proves to be the source 
of great admiration and frustration alike for students of the work. His classical 
Critique of Violence6, for instance, not only forces us to question how violence 
continues to be integral to the formation of modern political systems. As it 
triangulates politics, religion and violence to ask difficult questions regarding the all 
too theological nature of secular modernity, Benjamin situates the problematic of 
violence in much broader and more challenging frame. It is also an obscure 
provocation that remains open to interpretation and continues to be fiercely contested. 
Its principle message we can take here however is clear: Since all violence brings us 
into moral relations, the critique of violence must address fundamental questions of 
political theology. 
Given the revolutionary spirit and personal tragedy associated with the life of 
Benjamin, it is easy to see why his analysis is often interpreted as a way to link 
violence to pedagogies for the oppressed. Confronting systems of illegitimate power, 
advocates have been thoroughly approving of the meaning and significance of the 
Benjaminian Critique in particular as a means for theorising why people continue to 
resist that which they find intolerable. This wagers the revolutionary spirit of what 
Benjamin termed “Divine Violence” against the “Mythical Violence” of established 
order. While these distinctions remain worthy of our attention, it is not sufficient to 
simply comport Benjamin into the 21st Century as if the structures of power and its 
logics of violence remain consistent.  We live in a different political moment. So 
whilst there is still much to be gleaned from historical applications of Benjamin’s 
text, there is also a need to both rethink and extend the narrative if it is to evidence 
contemporaneousness. While it can be argued, for instance, that orthodox readings of 
Benjamin’s work allow for neat explanations of violence within the spatial framework 
                                                                        
6 Walter Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’ in Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings, ed. Peter Demetz 
(Shocken Books: New York, 1986) 277-300 
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of Sovereign States, the global ambitions, adventures, and changing fortunes of 
liberal powers for the past few decades demand a new angle of vision. That is to say, 
as liberal forms of violence have increasingly taken place without the requisite 
Sovereign warrants as traditionally understood in any spatial sense, it is not 
satisfactory to start our analysis with some foundational Myth as defining of the 
political landscape (i.e. the myth of nationhood) or to equate divine violence simply 
with the “violence of critique” as often deployed today. With this in mind, this paper 
will address the following questions: How might we rethink Benjamin’s legacy once 
we look to critique the lethality of liberal freedoms whose violence has worked by 
casting aside any pretence for sovereign integrity? How does this lethality demand a 
fundamental reassessment of the theological paradigms of the modern? And how may 
we further question the relevance of Benjamin as a critical theorist of violence as 
liberalism now faces what seems to be an irresolvable crisis of its own making and 
ambitions?  
From the Mythic to the Divine 
To do these questions justice there is a need to begin with Benjamin’s Critique, which 
identifies two very distinct forms of violence, and whose literal interpretation appears 
to set them in strategic opposition. What Benjamin terms “Mythical Violence” relates 
to an original use of force that is necessary in the very constitution and unification of 
the political order. The famous cover that adorns Thomas Hobbes “Leviathan” 
provides the most obvious representation of this. Law is understood here as a 
manifestation of that mythic power that translates the will to collectivise into a 
distinct form of forced ordering. Such violence, for Benjamin, forces the human to 
remain imprisoned within a state of “natural life”. It denies citizens more liberating 
ethical alternatives as the guilt of mere existence is continually reaffirmed by the 
spectre of violence law permits. Something Kafka understood all too well7. “Divine 
Violence”, in contrast, Benjamin notes, constitutes a form of violence that is law 
breaking. If the former sets boundaries, the latter boundlessly destroys them. If 
mythical violence brings at once guilt and retribution, divine violence destroys in 
order to bring about the conditions of the new. While mythical violence therefore 
demands some original conception of guilt so that all must stand in obedience before 
                                                                        
7 On this and for a excellent engagement with Divine Violence, more generally, see, James Martel, Divine Violence: Walter 
Benjamin & the Eschatology of Sovereignty (London: Routledge, 2011) 
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the law, divine violence challenges the power of Sovereign authority by virtue of the 
sanctity of the living: ‘Mythical violence is bloody power over mere life for its own 
sake, divine violence pure power over all life for the sake of the living. The first 
demands sacrifice, the second accepts it.’8  
Divine violence thus appears here as a form of violence that takes place without 
Sovereign warrant. It asks not of any authorities blessing for political action. It moves 
beyond any Schmittean notion of the Sovereign privilege, especially the claim to hold 
a monopoly over what can rightfully be killed in the name of that order. In doing so, 
divine violence represents a categorical denial of Sovereign claims to authenticity and 
its brutalising community at the moment of insurrection. As Benjamin explains, it 
‘strikes them without warning, without threat, and also does not stop short of 
annihilation. But in annihilating it also expiates, and a deep connection between the 
lack of bloodshed and the expiatory character of this violence is unmistakable’. This 
evidently influenced Jacques Derrida’s thesis on the “Force of Law”. For Derrida, 
while there is something mythical about forms of violence that can be traced back to 
the Apollonian Greek model, the genealogy of the divine is more in tune with anti-
idolatrous Jewish scripture:  
There are two violences, two competing Gewalten: on the one 
side, decision (just, historical, political, and so on), justice 
beyond droit and the state, but without decidable knowledge 
[this is, the ‘Jewish’ divine violence]; on the other, decidable 
knowledge and certainty in a realm that structurally remains 
that of the undecidable, of the mythic droit of the state 
[Greek, mythic]. On the one side [Jewish] the decision 
without undecidable certainty, on the other [Greek] the 
certainty of the undecidable without decision.9  
Giorgio Agamben provides a novel interpretation of these typologies in his canonical 
text Homo Sacer10. Foregrounding the originality of the mythical as being 
constitutive of the bounded realm of Sovereign order, Agamben highlights the 
                                                                        
8 Benjamin, Divine Violence p. 297 
9 Jacques Derrida ‘Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority’ in Deconstruction & the Possibility of Justice Eds. 
Drucilla Cornell, Michael Rosenfeld and David Carson (New York, Routledge, 1992) 56 
10 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995) 
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paradigmatic importance of spatial figuration of the camp and its relationship to those 
lives that are denied all political quality (zoe). This provides the setting for rethinking 
divine violence as a pure form of outrage, which by definition is radically distinct 
from law. Importantly, for Agamben, divine violence is the very order of the political 
as it reveals a bloodless potentiality (i.e. the capacity to bring about new conditions 
on earth yet to be realised) unmediated without end: ‘Here appears the theme-which 
shines only for an instant, and yet long enough to illuminate the text in its entirety-of 
violence as “pure means”, which is to say, as the figure of a paradoxical “mediality 
without end”: i.e., a means that, while remaining such, is considered independently of 
the ends it pursues’11.  
Agamben’s focus on the pure means allowed for a non-violent interpretation of the 
divine. The violence is merely the expression of an open-ended critique deemed to be 
pure insomuch as it operates free from structural and bounded constraints. It puts 
itself on the side of life against the exceptionalism of Sovereign power, which can 
only bring violence to life in order to politically authenticate the true meaning of 
subjectivity contra the most violent forms of disqualification and abandonment from 
the realms of civility. Mythical violence is thus exposed as the hidden foundation of 
Sovereignty. It is a normalising force, whose very “order of being” wages continual 
violence upon the internal order in the name of security, protection and identity 
formation.  
This different sacralisation of the mythical referent in Agamben’s interpretation 
demands a radical rethink of the relationship of law in respect to its claims over life.  
In particular, it is only by exposing the necessity of the divine as a pure form of 
critique that Benjamin allows us to bring the violence of law and order making into 
critical question. Moreover, since the mythical is always confronted with the very 
possibility of insurrection due to the capacities for critique that exists in any given 
political system, Benjamin’s violent framework also points more affirmatively 
towards the formation of alternative subjectivities whose forms-of-life are pure 
potentiality (potenzia). As Agamben writes elsewhere, this formulation ‘defines a life 
– human life – in which the single ways, acts, processes of living are never simply 
                                                                        
11 Agamben, Homo Sacer p. 105 
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facts but always and above all possibilities of life, always and above all power’12. 
Importantly, for Agamben, this potenzia begins in the imaginary: ‘I call thought the 
nexus that constitutes the forms of life in an inseparable context as a form of life... 
only if, in other words, there is thought – only then can a form of life become, in its 
own factness and thingness, form-of-life, in which it is never possible to isolate 
something like naked life’13. Critical thinking is thus conterminous with the divine as 
it constitutes a direct challenge to the possibilities of reducing life to the mere 
biological fact of being – life in a naturalised form - what Agamben (in)famously 
terms “bare life”.  
Judith Butler follows this non-violent reading of divine violence to develop her earlier 
concerns with the (dis)qualification of lives through the powers of mourning. Reading 
Benjamin this way allows her to conceive of an alternative “non-violent violence” 
which can be ‘invoked and waged against the coercive force of law.’14 Highlighting 
Benjamin’s messianic-Judaic heritage, in particular, Butler “unleashes” divine 
violence ‘against the coercive force of that legal framework, against the 
accountability that binds a subject to a specific legal system and stops that very 
subject from developing a critical, if not revolutionary point of view on that legal 
system.’ Central to Butlers interpretation is the claim that its violence explicates 
forms of violence that are depended upon establishing the foundational nature of guilt 
as identified by Benjamin’s earlier provocation. The divine is thus appears as a 
strategic form of ethical and political intervention, which embracing the idea that 
critique is the order of battle, willingly enters into an intellectual conflict with all too 
real forms of violence, moral entrapments and forceful unifications as enshrined in 
juridical systems. It is as she writes: 
The desire to release life from a guilt secured through 
legal contract with the state – this would be a desire that 
gives rise to a violence against violence, one that seeks 
                                                                        
12 Giorgio Agamben, Means Without End (Minnesota, University of Minnesota Press : 2000) p.4.4 
13 Agamben, Means Without End p 8, 9 
14 Judith Butler ‘Critique, Coercion & Sacred Life in Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence”’ in Political Theologies eds. de Vries 
& Sullivan,  p. 201 
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to release life from a death contract with the law, a 
death of the living soul by the hardening force of guilt15.  
This “non-violence violence” reading has less convinced Slavoj Zizek. Focusing 
instead upon the distinction between the realm of the “subjective” (i.e. headline 
violence such as 9/11) and the hidden yet objective “symbolic” realities of everyday 
violence, Zizek demands an account of the divine that remains grounded in the 
concrete reality of revolutionary moments that history shows to be far from 
“bloodless”16. As he explained in response to a question on the relationship between 
violence and politics: 
This question is particularly confused on the Left. Let’s take 
the use made of two authors, Carl Schmitt and Walter 
Benjamin, for example. I don’t have any problem with 
Schmitt. But Schmitt’s concepts of “decision” and 
“exception” function precisely to erase the crucial distinction 
governing Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence”, namely the 
distinction between “mythical” and “divine” violence. For 
Schmitt, to put it quite simply, there is no divine violence. For 
him there is an illegal violence that is a foundation, a violence 
of the exception that gives rise to law. Many Leftists who flirt 
with Benjamin want to speak of some “spectral” violence that 
never really happens, or they adopt an attitude like Agamben 
and simply wait for some magical intervention. I’m sorry, but 
Benjamin is pretty precise. An example he gives of divine 
violence is a mob lynching a corrupt ruler! That’s pretty 
concrete.17  
Despite their differences here in terms of conceptualising violence – intellectual or 
physical, each of these authors nevertheless starts their analysis from the dominance 
of a mythical paradigm. Each also accepts that what makes the divine politically 
appealing is the way in which it offers a pure means for challenging the violence of 
established order, unbinding the forces of tyranny without asking for sovereign 
                                                                        
15 Butler, Critique, Coercion & Sacred Life p.211 
16 Slavoj Zizek, Violence: Six Sideways Reflections (London, Profile Books: 2008) 
17 Slavoj Zizek, Divine Violence & Liberated Targets. Online at: http://www.softtargetsjournal.com/web/zizek.php 
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permission, thereby explicating itself from the monopolised forms of violence in the 
name of the living. The Mythical then is collectively read here as the embodiment of 
a forced unity, whereas the Divine appears to be an unmediated revolutionary 
potential capable of bringing about the conditions of the new. If the Mythic retains its 
Sovereign integrity, the Divine opens a rupture in the field of internal oppression as 
the various systems of ordering integral to Sovereign authority are brought into 
critical question. Here’s the problem. In order to sustain this analysis, the Critique’s 
structural and juridical frames must still be accept as the dominant paradigm for 
political power and oppression in the 21st Century. The State, in other words, along 
with its constituted forms of juridical power, remains the principle referent object for 
political analysis. Such a reductionist approach to political analysis is no longer 
satisfactory. Not only has the sanctity of the modern nation state (understood as being 
the principle source of authority) been undermined by forces beyond conventional 
territorialities, liberal regimes of power have openly operated in the global space of 
flows for some considerable time, notably detaching themselves from traditional 
Sovereign moorings and claims to geo-spatial integrities. This is not simply a 
question regarding the contingency of the political environment. It takes us to the 
heart of our understanding about what actually constitutes liberalism in terms of its 
ambitions for bio-political control. 
Liberal theorists and practitioners often validate their actions by pointing to universal 
commitments to the shared “values” of freedom, the rule of law, justice and 
inalienable rights. Even the most orthodox of theorists should appreciate however that 
each of these terms remains deeply contested, masking in fact the most contingent 
abuses of political power. Indeed, there is an alterative and no less real history of the 
liberal encounter, which is marked by violence, racial subjugation, forceful 
intervention, and the persecution of those deemed to be of a different kind18. 
Crucially, for our purposes here, if we are to tease out the singularity to liberalism, 
there is a need to engage more critically with its effects at the level of power and not 
abstract idealisms. From this perspective, as argued elsewhere, there is a compelling 
case to define liberalism by the bio-political imperative of “making life live”. 
Operating within a global imaginary of possibility and endangerment, liberalism from 
this perspective posits the life of the political subject as central to its political 
                                                                        
18 Domenico Losurdo, Liberalism: A Counter History (Verso: New York, 2011) 
9 
 
strategies and ambitions. Such a reading allows us to acknowledge the forced 
compromise with the structural limitations imposed by the world of Nations, while 
appreciating how liberal ambitions, Immanuel Kant onward, have sought to create a 
planetary system that incorporates all life within its strategic orbit. Liberalism as such 
appears in this guise as promissory insomuch as it is predicated upon a political 
system already in waiting but yet-to-be-revealed; while providential insomuch as 
every subject is taken to be a liberal subject needing to be freed from whatever 
contemporary shackles.  
There is as such no foundational “myth” underwriting the liberal will to rule. It 
destroys in fact the very idea that politics may be grounded in set foundation truths or 
principles as related to fixed notions of identity i.e. myth of religion or myth of 
Mother/Fatherlands. Governing instead through a state of on-going emergency, crises 
and catastrophe to condition the possibility for the furtherance of its political rule, 
liberal forms of subjectivity undergo continual adaptation and change in relation to a 
number of complex political, socio-economic, technological and cultural factors. 
From the perspective of the subject, such factors focus in upon the changing 
ontological and epistemological accounts of life in terms of its potentialities and 
problematics19.  If there is then a mythical dimension to liberalism, it is an always-
deferred end-state that can only be realised, ultimately, through the wars, battles, 
conflicts and victories fought in its name. Liberalism as such is not self-evidently 
recognisable. We are not born appreciative of its value and moral systems (which in 
itself is impossible from the perspective of life due to their contingent and fleeting 
nature). It is a productive and all together politically economising will to rule 
planetary life that demands uncompromising forms of intervention upon the souls of 
the living. 
Michel Foucault’s bio-political intervention appears in this light to be much more 
than an attempt to provide new tools for critiquing power. It takes us to the heart of 
the political rationalities of liberalism by foregrounding the crucial question of what 
happens when power takes planetary life to be its object? And in turn, what happens 
when the destiny of the species as a whole is wagered on the successes or failures of 
its own political strategies? Not only do these questions demand reproaching violence 
                                                                        
19 See Brad Evans, Liberal Terror (Polity: Cambridge, 2013)  
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outside of a Sovereign/mythical frame. They force us to rethink the Benjaminian 
“divine” as perhaps being more apt in describing the all too real forms of violence 
which have taken place in more recent times, devoid of any need for Sovereign 
claims of integrity and non-interventionism as enshrined in the Westphalia peace. 
Might the divine in other words allow us here to gain a real tangible purchase of the 
theological nature of liberal power and its forms of violence that take leave without 
Sovereign warrant?  
A Liberal Theology? 
At the beginning of the Critique, Benjamin argued that ‘a cause, however effective, 
becomes violent, in the precise sense of the word, only when it enters into moral 
relations’. Morality as it appears for Benjamin here is inextricably linked to questions 
of political theology. Indeed, it is only by focusing more intently on the relations 
between morality, violence, and political theology that the Critique holds any 
conceptual value for us. That the idea of Sovereignty reveals powerful theological 
traces akin to the mythological contours put forward by Benjamin is now well 
established. As Carl Schmitt asserted ‘All significant concepts of the modern theory 
of the state are secularised theological concepts’20. Such appreciation has led James 
Martel to observe that ‘Schmitt articulates exactly how this notion of a break itself 
disguises the crucial (and theological) continuities with medieval and Christian 
notions of sovereignty… In this way, modernity has a new “political theology”, one 
that serves to disguise both the more traditional Christian inheritance of the modern 
state as well as the fact that the modern sovereign, like the Christian God, continues 
to decide upon the exception’.21 This concern with sovereignty as a political 
extension or sophisticated adaption of theology (both as a metaphysical and 
ontological phenomenon) equally resonated with Jacques Derrida. Sovereignty, he 
argued, evidences a kind of “ipsocentric[ism]” which points to a long cycle of 
political theology that is at once paternalistic and patriarchal, and thus masculine, in 
the filiation of father-son-brother’22. Such ipsocentricism is ‘revived or taken over’ by 
a newer version of itself, moving from the overtly religious and monarchic forms of 
sovereignty to ‘the unavowed political theology… of the sovereignty of the people, 
                                                                        
20 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
2006) 36 
21 Martel, Divine Violence p. 23 
22 Jacques Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005) 17 
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that is of democratic sovereignty’. The implications being, as Leo Strauss once 
observed, ‘What presents itself as the “secularisation” of theological concepts will 
have to be understood, in the last analysis, as an adaptation of traditional theology to 
the intellectual climate produced by modern philosophy or science both natural and 
political’23. So if ‘modern politics is a chapter in the history of religion’24 as John 
Gray maintains, how are we to grapple with the complexity and meaning of the term 
“political theology” without simply referring to something that is altogether elusive or 
beyond apprehension in any verifiable sense of the term? And how may we further 
link this to our concern with the theological dimensions to contemporary liberal 
violence? 
Although the theological is profoundly metaphysical as it connects questions of the 
infinitely unknowable with worldly redemption, it only gains tangible political 
purchase if it manages to reconcile ideas of salvation with the normative question of 
what it means to live authentically. While it should be apparent that salvation is 
central to all monotheistic religions, which offer heavenly reward for earthly 
obedience, it has proven to be no less compatible with secular visions of the “good 
life”. Political theology doesn’t simply relate in this regard to a belief in the 
omnipotence of God and its unitary demands of “Oneness”. It is actually possible to 
trace the remnants of theological reasoning to earthly/secularised conceptions of the 
politics, sovereignty, and justice. What is more, as Agamben points out in his The 
Kingdom and the Glory (whose cover image detailing the apse mosaic at Basilica 
Papale di San Paolo furore le Mura, Rome projects the unsettling image of the empty 
throne), while sovereignty represents important conceptual reworking of a distinct 
theological paradigms of the modern, it is also possible to reveal a different 
theological genealogy of the modern that is more economic – hence dynamic and 
productive in its modus operandi: ‘our concept of history has been formed according 
to the theological paradigm of the revelation of a “mystery” that is, at the same time, 
an “economy”, an organisation, and a “dispensation” of divine and human life… 
[What is more] from the beginning theology conceives divine life and the history of 
                                                                        
23 Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953) 317 
24 John Gray, Black Mass: Apocalyptic Religion & the Death of Utopia (London: Penguin, 2011) 1 
12 
 
humanity as an oikonomia, that is, that theology is itself “economic” and did not 
simply become so at a later time through secularisation.’25  
Agamben traces here the idea of a “divine economy” back to a decisive moment in 
the history of Christian theology in which questions pertaining to the Holy Trinity 
found practical meaning. Hence, for Agamben, it is possible to derive from 
Christianity a ‘political theology, which founds the transcendence of sovereign power 
on the single God, and economic theology, which replaces this transcendence with the 
idea of an oikonomia, conceived as an immanent ordering – domestic and not political 
in a strict sense – of both divine and human life’26. From this perspective, the 
economy is a ‘synonym for the providential unfolding of history according to 
eschatological design’27. Such a divinity does not propose any natural foundation for 
being. It overcomes the history of being as a metaphysical praxis. What is therefore 
commonly termed biopolitics, he believes, especially today, remains concerned with 
the “divine governance” of peoples according to some interventionist plan for earthly 
salvation. As Agamben writes elsewhere, ‘Rather than the proclaimed end of history, 
we are, in fact, witnessing the incessant though aimless motion of this machine, 
which, in a sort of colossal parody of theological oikonomia, has assumed the legacy 
of the providential governance of the world, this machine (true to the original 
eschatological vocation of providence) is leading us to catastrophe’28. According to 
Antonio Negri, this attempt to bring economy, political theology, and biopolitics into 
close relation is significant as it enables Agamben to nuance (indeed overcome) the 
limits of his juridical paradigm; ‘showing how economy becomes a simple agency of 
theological-political power: an exercise, thus, in the worldly reproduction of social 
life’29. Echoing Agamben’s theological concerns, what therefore becomes “the true 
problem” is ‘not sovereignty but government, not the king but the minister, not the 
law but the police force, that is, the state machine that they form and keep in 
motion”30.  
                                                                        
25 Giorgio Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy & Government (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2011) 45, 3 
26 Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory p.1 
27 Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory p.44 
28 Giorgio Agamben, What is An Apparatus? (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009) 23, 24 
29 Antonio Negri, Sovereignty That Divine Ministry of Earthly Life. Online at: http://www.jcrt.org/archives/09.1/Negri.pdf   
97 
30 Negri, Sovereignty That Divine Ministry p. 99 
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Agamben’s emphasis on the theological power of political economy seemingly 
contradicts his earlier instance that the camp is the defining paradigm of the modern. 
Indeed, whilst his spatial concerns with mythical violence moves him towards a 
positive embrace of the Benjaminian divine, this latest genealogy, which he now 
posits as the “truer” analytic of contemporary power, renders the divine altogether 
more problematic. Agamben it seems has become the victim of his own (arguably 
unwitting) spatial success – which although explained in terms of its ontological 
significance, nevertheless requires giving utmost allegiance to questions of 
Sovereignty and juridical ordering as foundational to political analysis. Following his 
later work, however, hence moving beyond this camp as nomos hypothesis, it 
becomes possible to recognise how the spatial figuration of the camp is more 
peripheral or should we say absorbed and subsumed within a broader nomos of 
circulation31.  
Agamben’s insistence that the camp is paradigmatic also proves limiting when trying 
to interrogate the shifting contours of freedom as a violent condition of possibility, 
onto the ways this lethal account of freedom becomes moralised and 
governmentalized in the process of fulfilling the modernist demand of “making life 
live”. Critically engaging with John Pocock’s much celebrated The Machiavellian 
Moment32, Michael Dillon espouses the modern notion of freedom as understood to 
be factical freedom, that is a ‘condition of possibility’ which operates though a 
‘radically contingent time without warrant’33. This account of freedom, as Dillon 
suggests, not only makes the decisionism of Sovereignty (central to theorisations of 
its mythical qualities as per Schmitt) possible in the first instance, it forms the basis, 
as Machiavelli understood, of a ‘lethal violence’ by ‘constantly re-write the signs of 
the times via a continuous calculus of necessary killing’. Such calculative violence 
however is locked into a strategic predicament that is devoid of clear ethical 
coordinates in any universal sense. As Dillon writes, ‘Factical freedom as semiotic 
battle space is continuously required to signify how much killing is enough. But it can 
never resolve this strategic predicament because the very contingency of evental time 
upon which its freedom relies denies it the possibility of ever securely computing the 
                                                                        
31 See Brad Evans & Michael Hardt, “Barbarians to Savages: Liberal War Inside and Out” (Theory and Event, Vol. 13, No. 3, 
2010) 
32 John G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought & the Atlantic Political Tradition (Princeton, 
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strategic calculus of necessary killing which ultimately defines its moment. When 
asked to say how much killing is enough, whatever it replies, factical freedom is 
equipped to give only one answer: more’. That is why, for Dillon, the performative 
enactment of facticity reveals both the contingency and lethality of modern 
conceptions of freedom such that it needs to drawn upon something of the order of 
the divine:  
If it cannot secure a strategic calculus of necessary 
killing, the Machiavellian moment becomes guilty of 
mere murder. It must therefore also deliver without 
being guilty of homicide; failing to establish the 
necessity of its killing. Its violence must therefore 
somehow expiate as it prevails. In want, however, of a 
strategic calculus of necessary killing which would do 
precisely that, by determining how much killing is 
enough, the only violence capable of meeting its 
requirement of 'cruelty well-used' is one so great that it 
will prevail without application; since any and every 
application, in practice, is subject to the fallibility of any 
and every strategic calculus in force. Such violence is 
the messianic violence which Walter Benjamin called 
'divine violence'.   
Freedom as presented here is a violent and productive condition of possibility. 
Cruelty well used becoming strategically virtuous if it can be aligned with freedom 
well served. Is this not exactly how the liberal violence (as justified in the name of the 
freedoms of the oppressed) operates in practice? As Foucault explained, the liberal 
conception of freedom does not refer to a state of affairs wherein the subject is simply 
allowed to “be free”; on the contrary, fearing autonomy, it designates the production 
of particular conceptions of freedom within a broader milieu of contested and 
conflicting circulations. Liberal freedom in other words is presented as virtuous 
insomuch as it claims to be the most enlightened and progressive discourse for human 
emancipation, while strategic insomuch as its all-inclusive understanding of freedom 
is dependent upon the necessity of forceful interventionism, along with a continuous 
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recourse to lethal calculations in the everyday policing of the flows of existence. 
What is more, taking Benjamin to be correct when he argues violence necessarily 
raises questions of morality, we might also add that protection against forms of 
violence as defined most notably by the security imperative also brings us into 
distinctly moral relations, perhaps as the most viable way of justifying interventions 
and bringing about forced change in the subjects behaviours. Like freedom, however, 
the liberal problematic of security is no mere static or foundational affair. It proposes 
an account of humanised security, notably globalised during the 1990’s, which bring 
together into a consolidating strategic nexus matters of (under)development, 
catastrophe, and everyday states of unending emergency in order to promote forms of 
political governance that take direct aim at the productive life of globally 
endangered/endangering subjects34. 
Freedom well served in a liberal sense points directly to a deeply moralised terrain of 
regulated circulations. It manages to reconcile, without contradiction, universally 
endowed moral claims to security, justice and rights, with the contingent deployment 
of violence, forceful social transformation, and a continuous recourse to policing in 
the name of life necessity. Complimenting the strategic calculus of necessary killing, 
these violent contours of liberal rule also point to a distinctly moralised bio-political 
heritage, which begins with Immanuel Kant35. While Jean Jacques Rousseau was 
arguably the first to philosophically question whether it was possible to have a 
modern concept of evil by directly connecting concerns with human suffering to the 
realms of human action and behaviour, it is with Kant that sovereign theology is 
displaced by the eschatology of a living. The conception of radical evil Kant proposes 
leads to the abandonment of original sin, while still retaining something of a moral 
burden – albeit in a way that reworks the biblical story of the fall. As Kant would 
write, ‘we may presuppose evil to be subjectively necessary to every man, even the 
best’36. The Kantian subject instead therefore suffers a productive fall from grace on 
account of his or her own deficiencies, fallibilities and inabilities in worldly 
behaviours. It is a subject burdened by the guilt of its own (un)making. As Sharon 
Anderson-Gold writes: 
                                                                        
34 On this see in particular Mark Duffield, Development, Security & Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples (Polity: 
Cambridge, 2007)  
35 Evans, Liberal Terror 
36 Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone p.32 
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Kant’s claim that evil was the “character of the species” was 
itself foundational for the way in which the moral life of the 
individual should be understood... Since historical progress is 
an attribute of the species, the source of this progress must be 
in some moral attribute of humanity that, for judgements of 
moral development, is the functional equivalent of the good 
will... Kant identifies the human predisposition to morality as 
a historical operative cause... That radical evil affects the 
entire species binds the destiny of each to all both as matter of 
global interdependence and as a matter of historical legacy37.     
Kant proposed a human-divine partnership through which salvation was tied to moral 
(re)generation. This is not simply grand theorising. It has reflected the empirical 
reality of the world in which liberal theorists and policy practitioners have been re-
working the concept of rights on more progressive socio-economic lines for some 
considerable time. This non-foundational metaphysics evidences the more purposeful 
legacy of the Kantian project. For whenever we say that something is “unnecessary”, 
we are stepping directly towards the Kantian problem of “radical evil” in which the 
transcendental principle for rule gracefully intervenes with its own enduring presence. 
And like all transcendental principles, its inaccessibility ensures that it retains 
something of the mystery of a divine supplement since we have to admit a work of 
grace as something incomprehensible.  As Allen Wood noted, while Kant’s notion of 
evil invariably links human action to the transcendental level, it also functions 
‘systematically by means of an examination of the sources, extent, and limits of 
human capacity’38.  
Gordon Michalson Jnr. captured the implications of this tremendous moral burden 
majestically with the title Fallen Freedom39. As Michalson explains, ‘Kant’s 
disturbing account of the way the free will turns against it own best interests suggests 
that each of us carries a malevolent stowaway that could come to life at any 
moment’40. This evidences ‘the terrible paradox that our fallenness is our own doing – 
                                                                        
37 Sharon Anderson-Gold, Unnecessary Evil: history and moral progress in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant (New York, 
State University Press: 2001) pp. xi, 3,  
p. xi, 3,  
39 Gordon Michalson Jnr., Fallen Freedom: Kant on Radical Evil & Moral Regeneration (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press:1990)  
40 Michalson, Fallen Freedom p.x 
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terrible, because within the Kantian framework this amounts to reason virtually 
turning against its own best interests, and freedom freely producing its own most 
severe debility’41. With this in mind, we might argue that Kant’s timely political 
revival in the latter part of the 20th Century was not in any way incidental. He was a 
philosopher whose time had come as far as liberal power was concerned. Not only 
would his thought give moral armoury to the violence of the liberal interventionism. 
He provided moral justification for war, which more than for the mere defence of 
peoples, would be explicitly fought in the name of humanity complete. It is Kant who 
thus philosophically binds the lethality of freedom without Sovereign warrant with 
the bio-political imperative to make life live in a way that summons forth a distinct 
theological claim; thereby displacing the language of foundationalism with a more 
promissory note. Our task is to relate this to the question of violence in more 
contemporary times.  
Liberal War as Divine Violence 
Despite universal claims to peaceful co-habitation, liberal regimes have been 
compelled to make war on whatever threatens it42. This is why the liberal account of 
freedom has depended upon a lethal principle, which discursively wrapped in the 
language of rights, security and justice, inaugurated planetary state of warfare and 
siege. It has promoted an account of freedom that, in the process of taking hold of the 
problem of the planetary life of political subjects, linked human potentiality to the 
possibility of its ruination. If liberal violence has then produced a necessary lethal 
corollary in its mission to foster the peace and prosperity of the species in order to 
alleviate unnecessary suffering; so it has also needed to foster a belief in the necessity 
of violence in the name of that suffering and vulnerability to which it continually 
stakes a claim.  
The Liberal wars of the past two decades in particular have revealed a number of 
defining principles43. Aside from relying upon technological supremacy and universal 
claims to truth, they have been overwhelmingly driven by a bio-political imperative, 
which has displaced concerns with Sovereign integrities with forms of violence 
                                                                        
41 Michalson, Fallen Freedom p.7 
42 See Dillon & Reid, The Liberal Way of War; & Julian Reid, The Biopolitics of the War on Terror: Life Struggles, Liberal 
Modernity and the Defence of Logistical Societies (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2006). 
43 I have explored these in more detail elsewhere. See Brad Evans (2011) “Liberal War: Introducing the Ten Key 
Principles of 21st Century Bio-Political Warfare” (The South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 110 (3) ISSN 0038-2876) 747-756 
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carried out in the name of an endangered humanity. In this regard, they have 
destroyed the Westphalia pretence, seeing the catastrophes of our global age in fact as 
a condition of possibility to further the liberal will to rule. Since incorporation in this 
setting has proceed on the basis that all life should necessarily be included within its 
strategic orbit, the veritable evisceration of any sense of “the outside” (as conceived 
in terms of its political imaginary) has led to the blurring of all conventional 
demarcations between friends/enemies, citizens/soldiers, times of war/times of peace. 
What is more, as life itself became increasingly central to questions of security, issues 
of development as broadly conceived would no longer be regarded as peripheral to 
the war effort. It would in fact become a central motif as most notably articulated in 
the strategic mantras “War by Other means” and “War for Hearts and Minds”. Not 
only would this point to new forms of de-politicisation which, less about Schmittean 
exceptionalism, were more explicable in terms of the fundamental political and social 
transformation of societies. It would also lead to the production of violent subjects, as 
the recourse to violence became sure testament to a conception of humanity realised 
through the wars fought in its name. Liberal violence, in other words, proved to be 
unbounded, unlimited and without conventional Sovereign warrant – namely 
revealing of the fundamental principles of what Benjamin once elected to term “the 
divine”. 
Diagnosing the liberal wars of the past two decades as a form of divine violence 
offers a more disturbing reading of the violence of the liberal encounter. If the 
violence of political realism, at least in theory, appreciated the value of limits and 
boundaries, what seems to define the lethality of liberal freedom has been a 
commitment to war without boundaries, hence limitless. As Dillon and Julian Reid 
acutely observed:   
[L]iberal peacemaking is lethal. Its violence a necessary 
corollary of the aporetic character of its mission to foster the 
peace and prosperity of the species... There is, then, a martial 
face to liberal peace. The liberal way of rule is contoured by 
the liberal way of war... Liberalism is therefore obliged to 
exercise a strategic calculus of necessary killing, in the course 
of which calculus ought to be able to say how much killing is 
19 
 
enough...[However] it has no better way of saying how much 
killing is enough, once it starts killing to make life live, than 
does the geopolitical strategic calculus of necessary killing’44.  
This brings us to Steven Pinker’s Better Angels of Our Nature45. Reworking the well-
rehearsed liberal peace thesis, for Pinker, the reason we have become less warlike 
today can be account for in terms of our liberal maturity. Leaving aside the evident 
theological undertones to Pinker’s work, along with the numerous empirical flaws in 
his thesis, his not so original thesis at least accredits its all too Euro-centric sources of 
inspiration on matters of civility: ‘The reason so many violent institutions succumbed 
within so short a span of time was that the arguments that slew them belong to a 
coherent philosophy that emerged during the Age of Reason and the Enlightenment. 
The ideas of thinkers like Hobbes, Spinoza, Descartes, Locke, David Hume, Mary 
Astell, Kant, Beccaria, Smith, Mary Wollstonecraft, Madison, Jefferson, Hamilton 
and John Stuart Mill coalesced into a worldview that we can call Enlightenment 
humanism’. John Gray has been rightly suspicious of the entire project and claims 
being made here:  
The idea that a new world can be constructed through the 
rational application of force is peculiarly modern, animating 
ideas of revolutionary war and pedagogic terror that feature in 
an influential tradition of radical Enlightenment thinking. 
Downplaying this tradition is extremely important for Pinker. 
Along with liberal humanists everywhere, he regards the core 
of the Enlightenment as a commitment to rationality. The fact 
that prominent Enlightenment figures have favoured violence 
as an instrument of social transformation is—to put it 
mildly—inconvenient... No doubt we have become less 
violent in some ways. But it is easy for liberal humanists to 
pass over the respects in which civilisation has retreated. 
Pinker is no exception. Just as he writes off mass killing in 
developing countries as evidence of backwardness without 
enquiring whether it might be linked in some way to peace in 
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the developed world, he celebrates “re-civilisation”... without 
much concern for those who pay the price of the re-civilising 
process46. 
Gray showed his evident concerns here with the promissory nature of liberal violence. 
Indeed, what he elsewhere terms the violence of the liberal missionary, reposes 
Nietzsche’s further instance that ‘god is dead and man has killed him’ with a 
devastating humanistic critique47. Such violence, in the end, however has proved to 
be politically, ethically and economically narcissistic. Just as liberal advocates in the 
zones of crises now increasingly find themselves operating within fortified 
protectorates as part of a great separation from the world48, this has been matched, 
albeit it ways that initially appear disconnected, by new forms of violence which also 
takes place almost exclusively at a distance. Indeed, as liberal actors increasingly 
give up on the idea that the world may be transformed for the better, new modalities 
of violence are emerging which seem to be more logically in fitting with the new 
politics of catastrophe that increasingly defines our terrifyingly normal times. As the 
promise of violence and catastrophe now appears inescapable, insecurity is becoming 
normalised, dystopian realism becoming the prevailing imaginaries for political rule, 
and once cited claims to emancipation, unending progress and lasting security for 
peoples all but abandoned49.  
The politics of catastrophe and its relationship to “end of times” narratives adds 
another layer to our theological enquiry. As Jacob Taubes once noted50, there is 
perhaps something theologically different at work here between the pre-modern 
apocalyptic movements and the catastrophic reasoning now defining the 
contemporary moment. For all their nihilism and monotheistic servitude, at least the 
apocalyptic movements of yesteryear could imagine a better world than already 
existed. There is therefore a vast difference between the subjects which names its 
disaster ‘apocalypse’ to that which reads disaster in terms of ‘catastrophe.’51 Unlike 
apocalypse, there is no beyond the catastrophic. Its mediation on the “end of times” is 
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already fated. Catastrophe denies political transformation. It demands instead a forced 
partaking in a world that is deemed to be insecure unto the end. The upshot being, as 
all things become the source of endangerment, the human becomes the source of our 
veritable undoing.   
Angels of History 
Every war produces its casualties. Some of these stand out in terms of the sheer body 
count. The horror of mass warfare reduced to the most banal forms of inhuman 
quantification. Others, no less important, are its political and philosophical losses. 
What is increasingly clear is that the past two decades of liberal warfare, punctured 
but not initially determined by the tragedy of the events of September 11th 2001, 
ultimately put the very concept of war into question. The reluctance to officially 
declare war, even when our involvement in the politically motivated violence appears 
to be all too evident, now demands a move beyond the dominant frames which have 
shaped discussions for the past two decades. There is an important caveat to address 
here. What happened during last decade of the Global Wars on Terror cannot simply 
be inserted into a post 9/11 frames for analysis. Much of what passed for post 9/11 
justice or military excessiveness was slowly maturing in the global borderlands for 
some considerable time. If there is a departure it needs to be accounted for against 
this broader post-Cold War humanitarian sensibility through which liberalism 
absorbed local crises into its political fabric to further condition its violent 
interventions.  
It has been all too easy for political and social theorists to put the blame for the 
violence and atrocities of the Global Wars on Terror onto the shoulders of George 
Bush and Dick Cheney. This has allowed liberals to appropriate Schmitt as one of 
their own, hence reducing the entire war effort to the reductionist measures of “US 
hegemony/exceptionalism”. Such retreats back into state centric models have not only 
proved unhelpful in terms of questioning the normalization of violence, they have 
failed to grasp the complexity of war – especially how questions of universality, 
economy, power and the formation of political subjectivities can be rethought through 
violent encounters. What is more, the limits of these analyses have been further 
evidenced by the complete lack of engagement with political theology, failing to 
recognize the violence of universal ambitions, along with the need to put the 
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contemporary legacy of Kant on trial. Lets not forget Tony Blair and Barack Obama 
have embodied the liberal Kantian idea of political leadership better than any others 
throughout the history of liberalism. Any change in liberal fortunes must be 
understood in this context. 
We have witnessed in recent times profound changes in the violent cartography of 
what is a post-Iraq liberal influence. Instead of actively and one-sidedly engaging the 
world, humanely, violently or otherwise, what we are now encountering are new 
political arrangements shaped by forms of distancing and technological realignment. 
Just as liberal agents in the dangerous borderland areas increasingly find themselves 
operating within fortified protectorates as part of a great separation from the world, 
this is matched, albeit it ways that initially appear disconnected, by new forms of 
violence that also take place at a distance. The political and philosophical 
significance of this should not be underestimated. The technological and strategic 
confluence between the remote management of populations (notably surveillance) 
and new forms of violence are indicative of the narcissism of a liberal project that 
reeks of the worst excesses of technological determinism. Instead of looking with 
confidence towards a post-liberal commitment to transforming the living conditions 
of the world of peoples, what has taken its place is an intellectually barren landscape 
offering no alternative other than to live out our catastrophically fated existence. This 
is instructive regarding how we might envisage “the end of liberal times” as marked 
out and defined by this incommensurable sense of planetary siege. It also demands 
new thinking about the relationship between violence, technology and theology in 
these uncertain times.  
The liberal wars of the past decade have been premised on two notable claims to 
superiority. The first was premised on the logic of technology where it was assumed 
that high-tech sophistry could replace the need to suffer casualties. The second was 
premised upon a more humanitarian ethos, which demanded local knowledge and 
engagement with dangerous populations. The narcissistic violence of the Global War 
on Terror has put this secondary vision into lasting crises as the violence of liberal 
encounter has fatefully exposed any universal commitment to rights and justice. Not 
only did we appear to be the principle authors of violence, thereby challenging the 
notion that underdevelopment was the true cause of planetary endangerment, 
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populations within liberal societies have lost faith in worldly responsibilities. 
Metaphysical hubris displaced by a catastrophic reasoning that quite literally places 
us at the point of extinction. Violence as such has assumed non-locatable forms as 
liberalism is coming to terms with the limits to its territorial will to rule. Physically 
separated from a world it no longer understands, it is now left to the digital and 
technological recoupment of distance to shape worldly relations with little concern 
for human relations. 
Drone violence is particularly revealing of this shift in the liberal worldview. While 
the first recorded drone strike was authorised by President George Bush in Pakistan 
on 18th June 2004, it has been during the Presidency of Obama that the use of the 
technology has become the more favoured method for dealing with recalcitrant 
elements in the global borderlands. Indeed, it seems, whilst the Bush administration 
favoured extraordinary rendition, detention and torture, the Obama policy for 
preventing the growth of inmates in camps such as Guantanamo has been their 
execution. Hence inhumane torture and barbarity replaced by the more dignified and 
considerate method of targeted assassination! While debates on drone violence tend 
to centre on questions its legality, especially whether it fits within established rules of 
war, little attention is given to the wider political moment and how the violence 
points to the changing nature of liberal power and its veritable retreat from the world 
of people.  
Whereas Bush and Blair launched a one-sided territorial assault on Iraq and 
Afghanistan in order to promote 'civilisation', Obama has waged his war in the 
deregulated atmospheric shadows where technological supremacy allows for the 
continuation of uninhibited forms of violence, while addressing the fact that the 
previous interventions failed by any given measure. Hence, this time, out of respect 
for public sensibilities a 'precise' or 'surgical' form of violence is delivered remotely 
to its distant adversaries. We should not forget however that the technologies, 
infrastructures and aesthetics essential for remote warfare are essentially the same as 
those that support the economy and consumer society. Targeted drone-strikes and the 
advertising that maintains the consumer hothouse essentially rely on the same 
computer-based technologies and algorithmic sense-making tools. Put another way, 
how Amazon mechanically predicts your next book purchase is not fundamentally 
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different from how adversarial behavioural patterns are isolated in authoring a 
signature-kill.   
Drone technologies are not simply a new tool of warfare that allow for legal or 
strategic reassessment. They are paradigmatic to the contemporary stages of liberal 
rule. As technological advance compensates for the “soldiers on the ground” 
militaristic retreat, they further radicalise the very idea of the territorial front line such 
that any Schmittean notion of inside/outside appears like some arcane remnant of an 
out-dated past. What takes its place is an atmospheric gaze that further eviscerates the 
human. From the perspective of violence, displacing the primacy of human agency 
from the act of killing represents more than the realisation of the military’s dream of 
zero casualties. It reveals more fully the dominance of dystopian realism as the 
defining rationality shaping the political landscape in the here and now, and beyond52. 
Demanding then of a new conceptual vocabulary that allows us to critique what 
happens when violence is neither orderly nor progressive, but is simply tasked to 
mitigate the demise liberal power and ambition in an uncertain world seems more 
pressing than ever.  
Benjamin once wrote about Paul Klee’s Angel of History (Angelus Novus) whose 
‘face is turned toward the past’. Linking his interpretation of this masterpiece to 
questions of violence with technology, Benjamin further observed, ‘Where we 
perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling 
wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the 
dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing in from 
Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such a violence that the angel can no 
longer close them. The storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back 
is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward’53. How might Benjamin 
have interpreted Klee today? Would he be compelled to reinterpret the work as the 
past now holds no epistemic comfort and the future prophesised to be littered with 
corpses of catastrophes to come? This is taken up by Henry Giroux who argues that 
Benjamin’s Angel of History can be seen as a metaphor for our contemporary 
condition which ‘has been blinded and can no longer see the destruction beneath its 
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feet or the clouds paralyzing its wings. It is now stuck in a storm without a past and 
lacking any consideration of the future’54. Thinking along these lines, what does this 
mean for developing a critique of violence adequate to our times? Indeed, on matters 
of political theology, can we perhaps understand drones to be the new angels of 
history, whose violence is most revealing of the political storm created by the 
narcissistic ambitions of liberal powers, which are now facing the prospect of 
terminal decline?  
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